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Winning the War on Drug Prices:
Analyzing Reverse Payment Settlements
Through the Lens of Trinko
Alicia I. Hogges-Thomas*
As drug prices continue to rise, many Americans are forced to choose between buying
food or medicine. In 1984, Congress sought to address this issue by enacting the HatchWaxman Act. The purpose of the Act was to increase the availability of generic drugs by
enabling the generic companies to challenge the brand companies’ patents in litigation.
But this purpose is frustrated when the brand companies pay the generic companies
millions of dollars to settle the litigation and delay their market entry. These settlements,
which are usually referred to as “pay-for-delay” or “reverse payment” settlements, benefit
the pharmaceutical companies at the expense of consumers.
Reverse payment settlements have been challenged under the antitrust laws. In the last
decade, the circuit courts have developed three approaches to analyzing reverse payment
settlements. None of the courts considered whether the patent was valid or infringed.
Furthermore, because courts favor settlement, the prevailing analysis has resulted in
absolutely no antitrust scrutiny of reverse payment settlements.
Most recently, the Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari in FTC v. Watson
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. This Article argues that the Court’s decision should be guided by
the principles in Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko. Those
principles will lead the Court to consider the particular circumstances of the
pharmaceutical industry and how the Hatch-Waxman Act affects competition in that
industry. After considering these factors, the Court should conclude that the policy
favoring settlement should not be considered in this antitrust analysis and that the courts
should decide the merits of the underlying patent claim.

* Assistant Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law. A.B., Harvard College;
J.D., Harvard Law School. I would like to thank my family for their never-ending love and support
while I worked on this Article.

[1421]

1422

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:1421

Table of Contents
Introduction.............................................................................................. 1422
I. The Hatch-Waxman Act .................................................................. 1424
A. Purpose and Summary ........................................................... 1424
B. The Natural By-Product of the Hatch-Waxman Act ... 1426
II. How Reverse Payment Settlements Harm Consumers............... 1427
III. A History of the Circuit Split ........................................................ 1430
A. The Cases ................................................................................ 1430
1. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation......................... 1430
2. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC......................................... 1431
3. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation ................. 1433
4. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust
Litigation (Cipro) .............................................................. 1434
5. Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v.
Bayer AG ........................................................................... 1435
6. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation ..................................... 1436
7. FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ............................. 1437
B. Analyzing the Three Approaches ..................................... 1438
1. Per Se Illegality .................................................................. 1438
2. The Exclusionary Scope Analysis .................................... 1438
a. A Patent's Right to Exclude Should Be Considered
Alongside the Public Interest in Removing Invalid
Patents .......................................................................... 1439
b. If These Settlements Actually Harm the Public,
Then Why Rely on the Policy Favoring
Settlement? ................................................................... 1441
3. Quick Look Rule of Reason ............................................. 1441
IV. The Solution: An Analysis Based on the Guiding Principles
of TRINKO .............................................................................................. 1443
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 1447

Introduction
For decades, Americans have struggled with the high cost of
prescription drugs. As prices continue to rise, some consumers forego
treatment completely. Others split their drugs in half or cross the
Canadian border in search of lower prices. In 1984, Congress sought to
remedy this issue by passing the Drug Price Competition and Patent
1
Term Restoration Act (the “Hatch-Waxman Act” or the “Act”). The

1. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
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purpose of the Act was to increase the availability of generic drugs
through patent litigation. The price of generic drugs is significantly lower
2
than the price of brand drugs. As a result, when a generic drug enters
the market, the brand company must lower its price to compete.
Unfortunately, the pharmaceutical companies are winning the drug
price war. The Hatch-Waxman Act envisioned a regime wherein generic
companies would challenge weak patents in litigation and then market
their drugs after demonstrating that the patent was invalid or not
infringed. Like many civil actions, these cases often settle. But these
settlements are unusual in that the brand company pays the generic firm to
delay its market entry. These payments are called reverse payment
settlements because the money flows from the patent holder to the alleged
infringer. In contrast, in an ordinary patent settlement, the payment flows
from the infringer to the patent holder. By paying the generic company
for delay, the brand company maintains its monopoly and the resulting
ability to control prices. The drug companies split the monopoly profits
of the brand company, which is a winning situation for both companies.
The losers are the consumers, who continue to pay high prices because
there is no competition for the drugs they need. According to the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”), reverse payment settlements are costing
3
consumers 3.5 billion dollars a year in the form of higher drug prices.
Although they have been challenged under the antitrust laws, most
courts have taken the position that reverse payment settlements are
essentially immune from antitrust scrutiny, except in very limited
circumstances. Any potential analysis must consider the fact that one of
the parties holds a patent. As a result, the settlement will only violate the
antitrust laws if the patent is invalid or if there is no infringement. If the
generic drug is infringing a valid patent, the patent holder has a right to
exclude the generic drug, and thus there is no antitrust violation.
In the last decade, the circuit courts have created three different
approaches to analyzing reverse payment settlements. Unfortunately,
none of these analyses address validity and infringement, the very issues
that determine whether there is an antitrust violation in the first place.
The fact that these agreements are litigation settlement agreements
further complicates the analysis. Historically, courts have favored the
settlement of litigation, and this policy is the primary justification for
their reluctance to decide the issues of validity and infringement.

2. Generic drugs cost 20–90% less than brand drugs. FTC Staff Report Finds 60 Percent Increase
in Pharmaceutical Industry Deals That Delay Consumers’ Access to Lower-Cost Generic Drugs, Fed.
Trade Comm’n (May 3, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/05/mmareport.shtm.
3. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Pay-for-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers
Billions (2010) [hereinafter Fed. Trade Comm’n, Pay-for-Delay].
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As the story continues, all eyes are now on the Supreme Court,
which recently granted a petition for certiorari in FTC v. Watson
4
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. This Article argues that the Supreme Court’s
decision should be guided by the principles in Verizon Communications
5
v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko. Those principles will lead the Court
to consider the particular circumstances of the pharmaceutical industry
and how the Hatch-Waxman Act affects competition in that industry. In
doing so, the Court should compare reverse payment settlements to
ordinary patent settlements and consider whether the Hatch-Waxman
6
Act diminishes or increases antitrust harm. Based on this industryspecific approach, the Court should conclude that when analyzing
antitrust challenges to reverse payment settlements, courts should
disregard the policy favoring settlement and decide the issues of patent
validity and infringement.

I. The Hatch-Waxman Act
A. Purpose and Summary
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, pharmaceutical
companies must file new drug applications (“NDAs”) with the Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”) before marketing a new drug to the
7
public. In 1984, Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act, which
amended the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to allow manufacturers of
bioequivalent generic drugs to file abbreviated new drug applications
8
(“ANDAs”) relying on the safety and efficacy tests of brand name drug
9
manufacturers.
When an ANDA is filed, the generic firm must certify, with respect
to each patent that claims the brand name drug or a use thereof, either
(I) that [the] patent information has not been filed, (II) that [the]
patent has expired, (III) . . . the date on which [the] patent will expire,
or (IV) that [the] patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the
manufacture,
use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is
10
submitted.

When an ANDA filer certifies under Paragraph IV that the relevant
patent is invalid or not infringed, it must notify the patent owner and the
11
brand name drug manufacturer. After the patent owner receives notice,

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

677 F.3d 1298 (2012).
540 U.S. 398 (2004).
Id. at 411 (citing Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990)).
21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012).
H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I) (1984); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(1)–(2).
H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2).
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
Id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iii).
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it has forty-five days to initiate a patent infringement action. If a patent
infringement action is initiated, the FDA will not approve the ANDA for
thirty months, or until a district court decides that the patent is invalid or
13
not infringed, whichever is earlier.
The primary purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to increase
14
generic drug competition by accelerating entry into the market. When it
files an ANDA, the generic drug company is not required to conduct the
15
costly clinical trials that are necessary when filing the entire NDA.
Furthermore, if it is proven in litigation that the generic drug does not
infringe the relevant patent, or that the patent is invalid, the generic drug
can enter the market before the expiration of the patent term. To
encourage patent challenges, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides a 180-day
exclusive marketing period for the first generic company that challenges
16
an invalid or non-infringed patent. In this way, the Act provides an
17
incentive for the testing of potentially weak patents through litigation.
The Act also sought to increase innovation by restoring time lost on
18
patent life while preparing for and awaiting FDA approval. Although
the statutory patent term in the United States was seventeen years,
pharmaceutical products were marketed for less time, because the patents
19
were obtained before FDA approval was granted. To counteract this
issue and encourage innovation, the legislature included a patent term
20
extension for pharmaceuticals undergoing regulatory review.
Furthermore, brand name manufacturers received a three-year market
21
exclusivity period for new forms and uses of previously approved drugs.
Hence, the Hatch-Waxman Act strikes a balance between
22
competition and innovation. Within this legislation is Congress’ judgment
on the amount of competition and innovation that serves the public
interest.

12. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
13. Id.
14. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I), at 14.
15. Id.
16. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
17. Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive Illegality,
108 Mich. L. Rev. 37, 61 (2009); see C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent
Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1553, 1579 (2006) (noting that the 180-day
“bounty” can be worth several hundred million dollars, inducing generic companies to challenge brand
name drug patents).
18. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I), at 14.
19. Id. at 17–18.
20. 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6) (2012).
21. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii).
22. Carrier, supra note 17, at 45, 62 (arguing that the Hatch-Waxman Act created a “nuanced
equilibrium between competition and innovation”).
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B. The Natural By-Product of the Hatch-Waxman Act
The first generic firm to file a Paragraph IV ANDA (“ANDA-IV”)
alleging patent invalidity or non-infringement is entitled to 180 days of
exclusive marketing after the application is approved. Until this 180-day
23
period expires, no other ANDA-IVs will be approved. But if a
subsequent ANDA-IV filer demonstrates that the patent is invalid or not
infringed, the exclusive marketing period of the first ANDA-IV filer is
triggered, enabling subsequent ANDA-IV filers to enter after the 18024
day period has ended.
Despite this fact, subsequent ANDA filers have little, if any, incentive
to select Paragraph IV and challenge the patent. A generic firm derives a
significant portion of its profits during the 180-day exclusive marketing
25
period. Recognizing the value of exclusive marketing, Congress created
the 180-day period to encourage generic firms to file ANDA-IVs that will
ultimately challenge brand firm patents in litigation. But if the first
ANDA-IV filer settles, the 180-day exclusive marketing period is not
transferred to subsequent ANDA-IV filers, even if they prove lack of
infringement or invalidity. This non-transferability of the 180-day reward is
the primary reason why other generic firms will refrain from filing ANDA26
IVs. For the few generic firms that believe that filing an ANDA-IV may
still be profitable without the exclusivity period, the requirement to wait
27
180 days to enter the market is an additional deterrent.
Thus, when the brand company pays the first ANDA-IV filer to delay
its entry, it essentially prevents all other generic companies from entering
28
the market. Given the regulatory structure, a reverse payment settlement
is the best option for brand companies. The payment preserves the brand
companies’ monopoly profits, whereas losing the litigation will cost them
29
billions of dollars. Generic companies also like the arrangement because

23. Hemphill, supra note 17, at 1578 (noting that the “legal form” of the exclusive period is a
delay in FDA approval of all other ANDA-IVs); see Carrier, supra note 17, at 47 (noting that the FTC
cannot approve other ANDAs until the 180-day period expires).
24. Hemphill, supra note 17, at 1587.
25. Id. at 1590.
26. The 2003 Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act created events
that would cause a first ANDA-IV filer to lose its 180-day exclusive marketing period. 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(D). However, it appears that this modification has not reduced the number of reverse
payment settlements, presumably because the 180-day reward is still not transferred to the next
ANDA-IV filer. See C. Scott Hemphill, Collusive and Exclusive Settlements of Intellectual Property
Litigation, 2010 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 685, 708 (2010) (arguing that generic firm challenges are
promoted by the 180-day period).
27. Carrier, supra note 17, at 47 (noting that the FTC cannot approve other ANDAs until the
180-day period expires).
28. Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes,
87 Minn. L. Rev. 1719, 1755 (2003) (noting that if the brand firm pays the generic firm to delay entry,
this postpones the start of the 180-day marketing period, locking other generics out of the market).
29. By paying off the generic company, the brand company maintains its monopoly position. As a
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the payment exceeds the profits they would have earned after winning
30
the lawsuit and entering the market.
Ironically, the Hatch-Waxman Act itself has provided the foundation
31
for reverse payment settlements. For this reason, reverse payment
settlements have been described as the “natural by-product” of the Act’s
32
180-day exclusive marketing provision.

II. How Reverse Payment Settlements Harm Consumers
Reverse payment settlements have affected the prices of various
33
popular drugs, such as Cipro and Plavix. The drugs at the center of
these lawsuits are used to treat common illnesses, such as hypertension
and breast cancer. Others prevent strokes and heart attacks. In addition
to individual consumers, lawsuits have been filed by wholesale drug
companies, pharmacies, workers’ unions, and health plans.
The federal government has taken the position that reverse payment
settlements harm consumers. According to the FTC, these agreements are
34
presumptively anticompetitive, costing consumers billions of dollars a
35
year in higher prices. Both the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice have filed amicus briefs in multiple private
monopolist, the brand company has the ability to control prices, which results in higher profits. But if
the brand company continues the litigation and loses, the generic company can enter the market.
Because generic drugs cost less, many consumers will switch to the generic drug, and the brand
company will be forced to reduce its price to compete. As a result, losing the litigation would cost the
brand company billions of dollars.
30. Carrier, supra note 17, at 39. When it delays entry by generic firms, the brand firm increases
its monopoly profits. It then uses a portion of the profits to pay the generic firm more than it would
have received through market entry. See Hemphill, supra note 17, at 1578 (concluding that the 180-day
bounty ensures that a reverse payment settlement is an attractive option for both the brand and
generic firms).
31. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 28, at 1755 (noting that it is generally accepted that the 180-day
period of exclusive marketing provides the potential for collusive settlement agreements between
brand firms and generic firms); see Hemphill, supra note 26, at 708. Hemphill argues that reverse
payment settlements are encouraged by the fact that the generic firm retains the 180-day exclusive
marketing period even if it settles. In his opinion, if the generic firm was required to give up the 180day period when it settled, that would reduce the harm of reverse payment settlements.
32. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1074 (11th Cir. 2005).
33. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012); Ark. Carpenters Health &
Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust
Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3 187, 206–07 (2d
Cir. 2006); Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Elan Corp., 421 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2005); Valley Drug Co. v.
Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896
(6th Cir. 2003); Kroger Co. v. Sanofi-Aventis, No. 1:06-cv-00263-HJW, 2006 WL 2503664 (S.D. Ohio
July 31, 2006); Biovail Corp. v. Mylan Labs, Inc., No. 1:01 CV66, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6726
(N.D.W.Va. May 2, 2003); In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
34. Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Chairman Jon Leibowitz on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit Ruling in the K-Dur 20 Matter, Fed. Trade Comm’n (July 16, 2012),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/07/kdur.shtm.
35. FTC Staff Report Finds 60 Percent Increase in Pharmaceutical Industry Deals, supra note 2.
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36

lawsuits. According to a report from the Congressional Budget Office,
eliminating these agreements would reduce federal government debt by
37
$4.8 billion over ten years. And on four occasions, Congress has tried to
38
pass legislation that would make these agreements illegal.
The majority of scholars agree that a presumption of illegality is
39
appropriate for these agreements because they are anticompetitive and
40
harm consumers. There are two reasons why courts should view these
settlements as atypical patent settlements that have harmful effects on
consumers.
First, reverse payment settlements decrease competition. Because the
180-day exclusivity period is not transferable, reverse payment settlements
41
prevent future patent challenges. By removing all competitors, reverse
42
payments force consumers to continue paying high prices. In contrast, if
there is a patent settlement in an unregulated industry, competing firms
will still challenge the patent because they can market their product
43
immediately if they win. The patent holder has no incentive to pay for
delay because the payment would not protect it from challenges from
other competitors. Also, an ordinary patent case usually settles with a
license agreement, which allows the infringing company to pay a royalty
44
and sell its product. In sum, an ordinary patent case in an unregulated
industry results in more competition, not less.

36. See, e.g., Brief for the United States, Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund, 604 F.3d 98
(Nos. 05-2851-cv(L), 05-2852-cv(CON)).
37. Cong. Budget Office, Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: S. 27 Preserve Access
to Affordable Generics Act (2011).
38. See Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2012, H.R. 3995, 112th Cong. (2d
Sess. 2012); America’s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009); Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); Drug Price
Competition Act of 2009, S. 1315, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
39. See Carrier, supra note 17, at 38 (“[C]ourts should treat such settlements as presumptively
illegal.”); Hemphill, supra note 26, at 708 (proposing that courts accord a presumption of illegality for
agreements that contain a substantial payment); Hemphill, supra note 17, at 1561–62 (concluding that
these settlements should be accorded a presumption of illegality); Hovenkamp et al., supra note 28, at
1720–21 (arguing that reverse payments that exceed litigation costs should be presumptively illegal).
40. Herbert Hovenkamp, Patents, Property, and Competition Policy, 34 J. Corp. L. 1243, 1251–52
(2009); see Carrier, supra note 17, at 75–76; Hemphill, supra note 26, at 703–05.
41. Michael A. Carrier, Solving the Drug Settlement Problem: The Legislative Approach,
41 Rutgers L.J. 83, 84 (2009) (“[R]everse payment agreements . . . are not typical settlements. They
are agreements that dispose of the validity and infringement challenges central to the Hatch-Waxman
scheme.”).
42. Hemphill, supra note 26, at 704 (“[Reverse payment settlements are] bad . . . . A pay-for-delay
settlement transfers wealth from consumers to drug makers in the form of continued high prices.”).
43. Carrier, supra note 17, at 61. Carrier notes that unlike pay-for-delay agreements, ordinary
patent settlements do not prevent other competitors from challenging the patent. In ordinary patent
cases, if a defendant settles and agrees not to challenge the patent, “many others often wait in the
wings to do so.” Id.
44. Michael Carrier, Innovation for the 21st Century: A Response to Seven Critics, 61 Ala. L. Rev.
597, 611 (2010); see Hovenkamp et al., supra note 28, at 1749–50.
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Second, the payment size demonstrates that brand companies are
45
purchasing a longer delay than their patents authorize. If no payment is
made, the length of the delay is a product of the strength of the patent
and, therefore, indicative of the strength of the parties’ litigation
46
positions. Thus, the larger the payment size, the greater the deviation
from the monopoly period allowed by the strength of the patent. The large
47
payment size also suggests that the patent is invalid. If the brand
48
company is likely to lose, it is more willing to pay for delay. In that
situation, there is no benefit that outweighs the competitive harm to
49
consumers. The enormous payments are even more disturbing when one
considers the high success rate among generic companies. According to a
recent FTC study, generic companies won seventy-three percent of cases
50
between 1992 and 2000.
Interestingly, between 2004 and 2009, seventy percent of Hatch51
Waxman settlements did not contain reverse payments. This suggests
that reverse payment settlements are not necessary to settle patent
infringement cases in the pharmaceutical context. But if reverse
payments are not required to settle these cases, then why would Bayer
52
pay $398 million to settle the Cipro litigation? The answer is obvious.

45. See Carrier, supra note 44, at 612. Carrier argues that in most cases, payments that exceed the
patent holder’s litigation costs are being used to buy a later generic entry than the patent itself can
provide. The general view is that payments that do not exceed the brand company’s litigation costs do
not raise a red flag. Id. See generally Hovenkamp et al., supra note 28, at 1758–60; Herbert
Hovenkamp, Sensible Antitrust Rules for Pharmaceutical Competition, 39 U.S.F. L. Rev. 11, 25 (2004)
(noting that even a plaintiff who is sure of success would be willing to pay less than its litigation costs
to settle the case).
46. Hemphill, supra note 26, at 703–04 (arguing that when a brand company makes a payment
instead of relying solely on the strength of its case, it secures a later date of entry—one that is not
warranted by the patent alone).
47. Carrier, supra note 44, at 612 (arguing that paying generics more than they would have earned
had they entered the market raises a red flag of potential invalidity).
48. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 28, at 1758 (“[T]he size of the expected exclusion payments are
inversely related to the strength of the patentee’s case: the less likely the patentee is to win, the more it
is willing to pay a generic to stay out of the market.”).
49. As Hovenkamp stated, “a larger payment suggests a more socially costly outcome—namely,
preserving the exclusion power of the patent, at least vis-à-vis this particular defendant, even though
the patent is likely to be invalid. The result is to deny the public the benefits of competition that it
could otherwise obtain.” Hovenkamp, supra note 45, at 25.
50. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study
16 (2002); see also Paul M. Janicke & Lilan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA
Q.J. 1, 20 (2006) (noting that, according to a Federal Circuit survey, brand companies prevail in only
thirty percent of cases).
51. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Pay-for-Delay, supra note 3.
52. The Cipro settlement totaled $398.1 million and delayed all generic entry until the end of the
patent term. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1329 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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The next Part summarizes the reverse payment cases that were
decided between 2003 and 2012 and analyzes the three approaches that
have emerged from those cases.

III. A History of the Circuit Split
A. The Cases
1.

53

In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation

Hoescht Marion Roussel, Inc. (“HMR”) sued Andrx Pharmaceuticals
(“Andrx”) after Andrx filed an ANDA-IV for a generic version of
Cardizem CD, which is used to treat angina and hypertension, and to
54
prevent heart attacks and strokes. In response to the ANDA-IV, HMR
filed a patent suit, triggering the thirty month waiting period for FDA
55
approval. But when the FDA tentatively approved Andrx’s ANDA-IV
(pending expiration of the thirty-month waiting period or a decision that
56
the patent was not infringed), the parties formed an agreement. Under
this agreement, Andrx agreed to delay marketing its generic version of
Cardizem CD. In addition, Andrx agreed to hold onto its 180-day period
57
of marketing exclusivity. In return, HMR agreed to pay Andrx
$40 million per year from the time that Andrx received FDA approval.
Furthermore, HMR agreed to pay an additional $100 million (less any
interim payments) in the event that certain events transpired during the
58
litigation. After the thirty-month stay expired, the FDA approved
Andrx’s ANDA-IV. HMR started to make its $40 million payments to
59
Andrx, and Andrx did not market its generic version of Cardizem CD.
About a year later, Andrx received FDA approval for a reformulated
60
version of Cardizem CD. On the same day, the parties settled the
infringement lawsuit and terminated the aforementioned “pay-for-delay”
61
agreement. Shortly thereafter, Andrx started to market its generic
62
version of Cardizem CD. At the time of the settlement, HMR had paid
63
Andrx a total of $89.83 million.
About a month after the parties signed their initial, pay-for-delay
agreement, purchasers of Cardizem CD filed complaints in various courts

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 899, 901.
Id. at 902.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 903.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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alleging violations of the federal antitrust laws and state antitrust and
64
consumer protection statutes. The plaintiffs alleged that the agreement
prevented Andrx from selling its generic drug when it received FDA
approval and prevented other generic firms from entering the market
due to Andrx’s postponement of the 180-day exclusive marketing
65
period. The district court concluded that the agreement (pursuant to
which Andrx was paid $40 million per year not to enter the market) was
a per se illegal market allocation agreement, and it granted plaintiffs’
66
motion for partial summary judgment. Specifically, the court stated:
There is simply no escaping the conclusion that the Agreement, all of
its other conditions and provisions notwithstanding, was, at its core, a
horizontal agreement to eliminate competition in the market for
Cardizem CD throughout the entire United States, a classic example of
67
a per se illegal restraint of trade.

Presently, the Sixth Circuit is the only circuit court to determine that a
reverse payment agreement is per se illegal. However, in its opinion, the
court noted that the agreement restrained generic firm Andrx from
marketing other versions of Cardizem CD that were not covered by the
68
patent litigation. As a result, many believe that the Sixth Circuit did not
intend to find all reverse payment agreements to be per se illegal, but
rather only those agreements that restrict competition beyond the scope of
69
the patent.
2.

Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC

70

Schering-Plough Corporation (“Schering”) manufactures K-Dur 20, a
potassium chloride product, which is used to treat high blood pressure and
71
congestive heart disease. In conjunction with K-Dur 20, Schering owns a
72
Upsher-Smith Laboratories
formulation patent on the coating.
(“Upsher”) filed an ANDA-IV for its generic version of K-Dur 20, which
73
is called Klor Con M20. In response, Schering filed a patent infringement

64. Id. at 903 n.7.
65. Id. at 904.
66. Id. at 905.
67. Id. at 908.
68. Id. at 908 n.13.
69. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1335 (“[A]lthough the
Sixth Circuit found a per se violation in In re Cardizem, the facts of that case are distinguishable from this
case and from the other circuit court decisions. . . . [in part because] the agreement provided that the
generic manufacturer would not market non-infringing versions of the generic drug. Thus, the agreement
clearly had anticompetitive effects outside the exclusion zone of the patent.” (citations omitted)).
70. 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005).
71. Id. at 1058.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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74

lawsuit. On the eve of trial, the parties entered into a settlement
75
agreement. As part of the settlement, the parties agreed on an entry
date for Upsher’s generic drug, and Schering agreed to license Niacor
and five other products from Upsher for an initial royalty fee of
76
$60 million. Around the same time, ESI Lederle, Inc. (“ESI”) filed an
77
ANDA-IV for Micro-K 20, another generic version of K-Dur 20.
78
Schering sued ESI, and the parties settled. ESI agreed that it would
79
enter the market three years before Schering’s patent expired. In
return, Schering agreed to pay $5 million and an extra $10 million if ESI
80
received FDA approval by a specified date.
About three years later, the FTC filed an administrative action
against Schering, Upsher, and ESI, alleging that the settlement agreements
81
violated the antitrust laws. The administrative law judge dismissed the
82
complaint, finding that the settlements were lawful. The FTC staff
83
appealed the decision to the full Commission, which reversed it. The
pharmaceutical defendants then appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit applied what is now known as the
exclusionary scope analysis. Citing to its decision in Valley Drug Co. v.
Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit examined: “(1) the
scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which
the agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive
84
effects.” To apply this test, the court examined the language of the
agreement and concluded that the language did not exceed the scope of
the patent. The court did not examine the validity of the patent at issue.
85
The judgment of the FTC was set aside.
86
According to 35 U.S.C. § 282, a “patent shall be presumed valid.”
The Eleventh Circuit relied on this presumption in finding that “Schering
obtained the legal right to exclude Upsher and ESI from the market until
they proved either that the ’743 patent was invalid or that their
87
products . . . did not infringe Schering’s patent.” The court also believed
that the exclusionary scope analysis reflected public policy:

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 1059.
Id. at 1060.
Id. at 1059–60.
Id. at 1060.
Id. at 1060–61.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1061.
Id.
Id. at 1062.
Id. at 1066 (quoting Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., 344 F.3d 1294, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003)).
Id. at 1076.
35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012).
Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1066–67.
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Given the costs of lawsuits to the parties, the public problems
associated with overcrowded dockets, and the correlative public and
private benefits of settlements, we fear and reject a rule of law that
would automatically invalidate any agreement where a patent-holding
pharmaceutical manufacturer settles an infringement case by
negotiating the generic’s entry date, and, in an ancillary transaction,
88
pays for other products licensed by the generic.

The court was concerned that a draconian rule would negatively impact
settlement activity.
3.

89

In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation

Zeneca, Inc. (“Zeneca”) sued Barr Laboratories, Inc. (“Barr”) after
Barr filed an ANDA-IV for a generic version of Tamoxifen, a breast
90
cancer treatment drug. The district court declared that the patent was
91
invalid, and Zeneca appealed. While the appeal was still pending, the
92
parties settled. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Barr
received $21 million and a license to sell Zeneca’s Tamoxifen under the
93
Barr label. Furthermore, Barr’s raw material supplier received
94
$9.5 million up front in addition to $35.9 million over the next ten years.
In return, Barr agreed to refrain from marketing its generic version of
95
Tamoxifen until Zeneca’s patent expired.
Consumer groups sued Zeneca and Barr, alleging that the
96
settlement agreement violated the antitrust laws. The district court
granted Zeneca and Barr’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
97
and the plaintiff consumers appealed.
On appeal, the Second Circuit applied the exclusionary scope
98
analysis. The court analyzed the language of the agreement and
concluded that any exclusionary effects were within the scope of the
99
patent. Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Second Circuit did not examine
100
the validity of the patent at issue. Rather, the court presumed that the
patent was valid, even though it was found to be invalid by the district

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 1076.
466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 190, 193.
Id. at 193.
Id.
Id. at 193–94.
Id. at 194.
Id.
Id. at 196–97.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 213–14.
Id. at 200.
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101

court prior to Zeneca and Barr’s settlement. In reaching its decision,
102
the court relied on the presumption of validity in 35 U.S.C. § 282. The
court also emphasized the public interest in the settlement of complex
103
and expensive litigation.
4.

In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation
104
(Cipro)

Bayer manufactures the antibiotic Cipro and owns the patent that
105
covers its active ingredient. A few years after the patent issued, Barr
filed an ANDA-IV for a generic version of Cipro, alleging that the
106
relevant patent was invalid and unenforceable. Bayer sued Barr for
infringement, and Barr entered into a litigation-funding agreement with
Rugby, a subsidiary of Hoechst Marion Roussel. Before trial, the parties
entered into a settlement in which the generic companies agreed not to
107
challenge the validity and enforceability of the patent until it expired.
In return, Bayer agreed to pay Barr $49.1 million initially, in addition to
108
quarterly payments, eventually totaling $398.1 million.
Direct and indirect purchasers of Cipro filed antitrust actions,
claiming that the agreement between Bayer and the generic companies
109
was an illegal market allocation. The district court denied plaintiffs’
motion for summary judgment and granted defendants’ motion for the
110
same. Because the indirect purchasers added antitrust claims that are
preempted by patent law, the case was bifurcated for appeal—the direct
purchasers’ appeal was heard by the Second Circuit, and the indirect
111
purchasers’ appeal was heard by the Federal Circuit.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit applied the exclusionary scope
analysis. In affirming the lower court’s decision, the Federal Circuit
found that it was within Bayer’s rights as the patent holder to exclude the
112
defendants from profiting from its patented invention. Plaintiffs argued
unsuccessfully that Bayer’s “right to exclude competition is not defined
by the facial scope of the patent, but rather is limited to the right to
113
exclude others from profiting from the patented invention.”

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 209 n.22.
Id.
Id. at 202.
544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1327–28.
Id. at 1328.
Id. at 1329.
Id. at 1329 n.5.
Id. at 1329.
Id. at 1330.
Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 103 n.10 (2d Cir. 2010).
Cipro, 544 F.3d at 1333.
Id. at 1332–33.
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The court also noted the “long-standing policy in . . . favor of
114
settlements.” According to the court, “[s]ettlement of patent claims by
agreement between the parties—including exchange of consideration—
rather than by litigation is not precluded by the Sherman Act even though
115
it may have some adverse effect on competition.” The court was not
persuaded by plaintiffs’ argument that it should consider the public
116
interest in removing invalid patents. Rather, the court concluded that,
“in the absence of evidence of fraud before the PTO or sham litigation,
the court need not consider the validity of the patent in the antitrust
117
analysis of a settlement agreement involving a reverse payment.”
Like the Second and Eleventh Circuits, the Federal Circuit invoked
118
Citing
the presumption of validity in support of its conclusion.
Tamoxifen, the court stated that a “settlement is not unlawful if it serves
to protect that to which the patent holder is legally entitled—a monopoly
119
over the manufacture and distribution of the patented invention.”
After losing before the Federal Circuit, the indirect purchaser
plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court for review, but their petition for
120
certiorari was denied.
5.

121

Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG

As was discussed above, the indirect purchasers’ appeal in Cipro
was transferred to the Federal Circuit, but the direct purchasers’ appeal
was heard by the Second Circuit. Following Tamoxifen, the Second
Circuit applied the exclusionary scope analysis and determined that the
122
language in the agreement did not exceed the scope of the patent.
In its analysis, the court explicitly declined to address the validity of
the patent:
The Tamoxifen majority urged against addressing the probability that a
patent was invalid and deferred to a patent holder’s desire to settle
patent challenges, concluding that a patent holder could reasonably
decide to pay money, even more than a generic manufacturer would
123
make on the market, to guarantee protection of its patent.

114. Id. at 1333.
115. Id. (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 n.5 (1931)).
116. Id. at 1334.
117. Id. at 1336.
118. Id. at 1337.
119. Id.
120. See Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, No. 08-1194, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (June
22, 2009) (denying certiorari).
121. 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010).
122. Id. at 104–06.
123. Id. at 108 (quoting In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 446 F.3d 187, 210 (2d Cir. 2006)).
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The court mentioned other policy considerations, but they were not
addressed in the court’s final analysis because it ultimately decided that it
124
was bound to follow Tamoxifen. However, the panel suggested that it
might be willing to reconsider the standard in Tamoxifen and cited various
reasons why the current case might be appropriate for reexamination by
125
the full court. In concluding, the panel invited plaintiffs to petition for
126
rehearing by the full court. Although plaintiffs complied with this
request and petitioned for rehearing en banc, unexpectedly, their petition
127
was denied. Subsequently, plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court for
128
review, but their writ of certiorari was also denied.
6.

129

In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation

In this case, consumers of K-Dur 20 filed a lawsuit against Schering,
Upsher, and ESI. The plaintiffs claimed that the companies’ settlement
of patent litigation was a reverse payment agreement that violated the
antitrust laws. This case challenged the same agreement that the FTC
130
The district court utilized the
challenged in Schering-Plough.
exclusionary scope analysis and granted the pharmaceutical defendants’
motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Third Circuit rejected the exclusionary
scope test, finding that it failed to subject reverse payment agreements to
any antitrust scrutiny and that it undermined the policies of the Hatch131
Waxman Act.
The Third Circuit opted to create its own analysis, which it referred
132
to as a “quick look rule of reason analysis.” This analysis was based in
133
part on the approach espoused by the FTC in its amicus brief. Under this
test, a reverse payment settlement is prima facie evidence of an
unreasonable restraint of trade, incorporating the concept of presumptive
134
illegality. After evidence of a reverse payment has been proffered, the
135
prima facie case can be rebutted. The court provided two examples of
how the prima facie case can be rebutted. First, the drug manufacturers
can demonstrate that the payment was not for delay, but for another
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 110.
127. Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 625 F.3d 779, 779 (2d Cir. 2010).
128. La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Bayer AG (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1606 (2011) (No.
10-762).
129. 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).
130. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005).
131. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214.
132. Id. at 218.
133. See Brief of the Fed. Trade Comm’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants and Urging
Reversal at 22–28, In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d 197 (Nos. 10-2077, 10-2078, 10-2079); see also Carrier, supra
note 17, at 76–78 (advocating a similar approach to that proposed by the FTC in its amicus brief).
134. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218.
135. Id.
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136

reason. Second, defendants can demonstrate that the payment creates a
procompetitive result that could not have been achieved absent the reverse
payment, such as “a modest cash payment that enables a cash-starved
generic manufacturer to avoid bankruptcy and begin manufacturing a
137
generic drug.”
The Third Circuit reversed the decision of the district court and
138
remanded the case so it could apply the aforementioned analysis. The
139
pharmaceutical defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for review.
7.

140

FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

Besins Healthcare developed AndroGel, a gel that treats low
141
testosterone. Solvay Pharmaceuticals obtained a license to sell AndroGel
in the United States. After it received FDA approval, Solvay obtained a
142
Watson Pharmaceuticals and Paddock Laboratories filed
patent.
143
ANDA-IVs in May 2003. In response, Solvay filed patent infringement
suits against both companies. Eventually, the defendants filed motions for
144
summary judgment. While those motions were pending, the thirty
145
month stay for FDA approval expired in January 2006. Faced with the
possibility of losing $125 million a year in profits, Solvay settled with
Watson and Paddock before the motions for summary judgment were
decided. Watson and Paddock agreed not to market their generic
146
versions of AndroGel until August 31, 2015. Solvay agreed to pay
Paddock $10 million per year for six years, plus $2 million per year for
back-up manufacturing assistance. Solvay also agreed to pay Watson
147
between $19 and $30 million per year.
When this agreement was reported to the FTC pursuant to statutory
requirements, the FTC filed an antitrust claim against Solvay, Watson,
148
Par, and Paddock. The FTC argued that Solvay was not likely to prevail
in the patent case because Watson and Paddock had strong evidence that
their products did not infringe the patent and that the patent was invalid.
As a result, the FTC argued, Solvay’s reverse payments extended a

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 787 (2012) (No. 12-265).
677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1303–04.
Id. at 1304.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1305.
Id.
Par entered into a litigation-sharing agreement with Paddock. Id. at 1304.
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monopoly that is not authorized under the patent laws, unlawfully
149
restraining competition.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
The district court applied the exclusionary scope analysis and granted the
150
motion. Relying on its decisions in Valley Drug and Schering-Plough,
the Eleventh Circuit also applied the exclusionary scope analysis and
151
affirmed the district court’s decision. Significantly, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that “neither the rule of reason nor the per se test is an
appropriate way to analyze the antitrust implications of a reverse
152
payment settlement.” The court opined that these traditional analyses
were inappropriate because “one of the signatories to the settlement
153
holds a patent, and a patent conveys a right to ‘cripple competition.’”
The court rejected the rule advocated by the FTC: “that an exclusion
payment is unlawful if, viewing the situation objectively as of the time of
the settlement, it is more likely than not that the patent would not have
154
blocked generic entry earlier than the agreed-upon entry date.”
According to the court, the “FTC’s position equates a likely result (failure
of an infringement claim) with an actual result, but it is simply not true that
155
an infringement claim that is ‘likely’ to fail actually will fail.”
B. Analyzing the Three Approaches
1.

Per Se Illegality

There is no escaping the fact that the Sixth Circuit’s per se illegal
approach is over-inclusive. Concluding that a reverse payment settlement
is illegal without considering validity or infringement ignores the
accepted view that a patent is a legal monopoly that gives the patent
holder the legal right to exclude competitors. If there is a valid patent
and the competing product infringes that patent, the patent holder can
pay its competitor to stay out of the market.
2.

The Exclusionary Scope Analysis

In contrast to the Sixth Circuit’s approach, the exclusionary scope
analysis accomplishes too little. In most cases, it results in a total absence
of antitrust scrutiny. Appropriately criticized as a “rule of per se legality,”
this analysis assumes that a patent has a scope without first determining if

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 1306.
Id.
Id. at 1312.
Id. at 1309.
Id. at 1310 (quoting Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005)).
Id. at 1312.
Id.
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156

the patent is valid. But if a patent is invalid, then there is no scope at
157
all.
To justify this conclusion, the courts invoke the presumption of
validity found in 35 U.S.C. § 282. But the presumption of validity is a
procedural presumption that allocates the burden of proof between the
158
parties. It is not substantive evidence of validity. Furthermore, it is clear
from the statute that this presumption was intended to be rebuttable: “The
burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest
159
on the party asserting such invalidity.”
Also, in cases where only infringement is disputed, the exclusionary
scope analysis creates a presumption of infringement that has no basis in
the law. In patent law, the burden of proof is on the patent holder to
prove infringement. There is no presumption of infringement.
Because it fails to address validity and infringement, the exclusionary
scope analysis ignores the very issues that determine whether an antitrust
violation exists. The widespread use of the exclusionary scope analysis has
resulted in an absence of antitrust scrutiny for reverse payment
settlements.
To understand the exclusionary scope analysis, one needs to
examine the policies that motivate it. First, the courts emphasize that a
patent gives the patent holder the right to exclude competitors, which
negatively impacts competition but increases innovation. Second, the
courts rely on the policy favoring settlement. These policies will be
addressed in turn.
a.

A Patent’s Right to Exclude Should Be Considered
Alongside the Public Interest in Removing Invalid Patents

The courts are correct that a patent is an exception to the rule that
competition is always better. If a patent is valid, the public benefits
produced by innovation outweigh the harm to competition. Thus, when
dealing with a valid patent, a court should uphold its right to exclude
competitors. But what if the patent is invalid? In this situation, there is
no benefit that outweighs the harm to competition. If the holder of an
invalid patent excludes all competitors through a reverse payment
settlement, the anticompetitive effects are not outweighed by any public
benefit. As a result, when dealing with an antitrust challenge to a reverse
payment settlement, courts should also consider the public interest in
removing invalid patents.
156. See Hemphill, supra note 26, at 705–06 (“[Courts] have adopted a rule that verges on per se
legality . . . .”).
157. Carrier, supra note 17, at 66 (“[I]f the patent is not valid, there is no scope at all.”).
158. See Carrier, supra note 41, at 86; see also Carrier, supra note 17, at 64.
159. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012).
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This policy has its roots in Supreme Court precedent. In Precision
Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery, the
Supreme Court noted:
The possession and assertion of patent rights are issues of great
moment to the public. A patent by its very nature is affected with a
public interest. . . . At the same time, a patent is an exception to the
general rule against monopolies and to the right to access to a free and
open market. The far reaching social and economic consequences of a
patent, therefore, give the public a paramount interest in seeing that
patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other
inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept within their
160
legitimate scope.

The public’s interest in removing invalid patents was also upheld in Lear,
Inc. v. Adkins: “[F]ederal law requires that all ideas in general circulation
be dedicated to the common good unless they are protected by a valid
161
patent.”
It is clear that the public interest in removing invalid patents
influenced the creation of the Hatch-Waxman Act. The purpose of the
Hatch-Waxman Act was to increase the availability of low cost drugs by
encouraging generic firms to challenge potentially invalid patents through
162
litigation. When a generic company files an ANDA-IV, it initiates a
process that was intended to end with a judicial decision regarding validity
and infringement. If the generic firm prevails in the litigation, it can enter
the market. The entry of competing drug makers increases competition
and pushes down prices.
The 180-day exclusive marketing period was created to encourage
firms to challenge potentially invalid patents and enter prior to patent
expiration. But in addition to encouraging litigation, it has provided the
incentive for reverse payment settlements, which prevent future patent
challenges. Through the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress selected the
163
amount of competition and innovation that serves the public interest.
Reverse payment settlements are private agreements that alter that
164
balance, favoring more innovation over competition.

160. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach., 324 U.S. 806, 815–16 (1945) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
161. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668 (1969).
162. See Carrier, supra note 17, at 60 (“[E]ven a cursory consideration of the statute underscores
the importance of patent challenges.”); see also Hemphill, supra note 17, at 1614 (describing litigation
as the instrument by which the Hatch-Waxman Act accomplishes its goals).
163. Hemphill, supra note 17, at 1614 (“[T]he [Hatch-Waxman] Act sets a particular balance
between innovation and competition.”).
164. Id. Hemphill argues that the balance between innovation and competition that the HatchWaxman Act creates for a specific drug is upset by a private settlement that favors more innovation
over consumer access.
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If These Settlements Actually Harm the Public, Then Why
Rely on the Policy Favoring Settlement?

Turning to the policy favoring settlement, it is clear that the courts’
reliance on this policy is completely misguided. The policy is premised on
the idea that settlements benefit the public, reduce litigation expenses,
and conserve judicial resources. Courts are increasingly promoting the
settlement of patent cases, which produce large litigation expenses and
165
are believed to consume a significant amount of judicial resources. But
as a society, we should be wary of assuming that all settlements benefit the
166
public interest. The courts consider the public interest when deciding a
167
case. But when parties enter into a settlement, the court is removed from
the process. The goal of the settling parties is to maximize their private
168
interests. Reverse payment settlements do just that—they maximize
the pharmaceutical companies’ profits at the expense of consumers.
Because research and data demonstrate that reverse payment
settlements harm consumers, the policy favoring settlement should not
be considered when analyzing reverse payment settlements.
Given the overwhelming evidence that reverse payments harm
consumers, one should question whether the courts’ reliance on this
policy is really motivated by a desire to protect the public interest. It
appears that the courts are hiding behind this policy to avoid the complex
169
and difficult issues that arise in patent cases.
3.

Quick Look Rule of Reason

The Third Circuit’s decision to reject the exclusionary scope analysis
and create its own test is a positive step. In contrast to the courts that
employed the exclusionary scope analysis, the Third Circuit refuses to
hide behind the policy favoring settlement, observing that
the judicial preference for settlement, while generally laudable, should
not displace countervailing public policy objectives or, in this case,
Congress’s determination—which is evident from the structure of the
Hatch-Waxman Act and the statements in the legislative record—that

165. See Matthew Zisk, Mediation and Settlement of Patent Disputes in the Shadow of the Public
Interest, 14 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 481, 483 (1999).
166. Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984). Fiss disagrees with the position
that settlement is always better than judgment. He argues that settlement should not be utilized “on a
wholesale and indiscriminate basis.” Id.
167. Id. at 1085.
168. Id. (arguing that parties may settle in a manner that leaves justice undone).
169. Hovenkamp argues that the courts’ reluctance to examine the underlying merits of the patent
claim is not due to the policy favoring settlement, but rather the difficulty inherent in determining
patent validity and scope. Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 1251.
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litigated patent challenges are necessary to protect consumers from
170
unjustified monopolies by name brand drug manufacturers.

The court further suggested that any analysis should also consider the
171
public interest in removing invalid patents.
The Third Circuit’s analysis provides some antitrust scrutiny. In
particular, their decision to treat reverse payment settlements as
presumptively illegal was appropriate. But under the Third Circuit’s test, it
is very easy for pharmaceutical companies to rebut the prima facie case.
First, the court stated that the prima facie case can be rebutted by
demonstrating that the payment was for a reason other than delay. But
pharmaceutical companies are already hiding their exit payments in
172
other transactions. That is what the drug companies were allegedly
173
doing in In re K-Dur.
Second, the defendants can demonstrate that the payment creates a
procompetitive result that could not otherwise have been achieved, such as
“a modest cash payment that enables a cash-starved generic manufacturer
174
to avoid bankruptcy and begin manufacturing a generic drug.” What
qualifies as “cash-starved” is unclear. This phrase is sufficiently broad that
most generic companies could fall into this category. Also, at what point
does a company decide to file for bankruptcy? And how do we define a
“modest cash payment”?
Although the Third Circuit suggested that the public interest in
removing invalid patents should be a factor in the analysis, in the end, its
quick look rule of reason analysis does not examine validity or
infringement at all. Like the courts that have employed the exclusionary
scope analysis, the Third Circuit has failed to consider the issues that
determine whether an antitrust violation has occurred.
If the patent is valid and infringed, then the brand company can rely
on the patent to exclude competition, and the reverse payment settlement
175
is not considered a market allocation agreement. But if the patent is
invalid or not infringed, then the agreement is a market allocation, which is

170. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 217 (3d Cir. 2012).
171. Id. at 215–16.
172. See Carrier, supra note 41, at 93. Carrier notes that the payments from brand firms to generic
firms are often hidden in other transactions. For example, instead of giving the generic firm a simple
cash payment for delay, the brand companies are paying generics for IP licenses, products and/or raw
materials, and advertising assistance. Id.
173. Schering (the brand manufacturer) promised to pay Upsher $60 million for three years to
license Niacor-SR. Shering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1060 (11th Cir. 2005). After the
settlement agreement was signed and the board ratified the acquisition of the license, plans to make
and market Niacor-SR were abandoned. Id. The antitrust plaintiffs argued that the license agreement
payment was in fact compensation to Upsher in return for its agreement not to enter the market. Id. at
1068.
174. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218.
175. Carrier, supra note 41, at 91.
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176

per se illegal. If an agreement is per se illegal, the defendant is not
177
entitled to argue that there is a procompetitive justification. This rebuttal
option is only available for agreements that are reviewed under the rule of
reason. The Third Circuit’s analysis incorrectly provides rule of reason
treatment for agreements that could very well be per se illegal market
allocation agreements. But we will only know if these agreements are per
se illegal if we first decide the issues of validity and infringement. As a
result, to rebut the presumption of illegality, defendants must demonstrate
that the patent is valid and infringed.

IV. The Solution: An Analysis Based on the Guiding Principles
of TRINKO
As the Eleventh Circuit noted in Schering-Plough, the “general
policy of the law is to favor the settlement of litigation, and the policy
178
extends to the settlement of patent infringement suits.” Furthermore,
settlements in patent infringement suits are not precluded by the
179
antitrust laws. Because settlement of patent litigation is generally
favored, and the antitrust laws do not preclude such settlements, under
normal circumstances, courts should consider the policy favoring
settlement when analyzing antitrust challenges to patent litigation
settlements. But we are not dealing with ordinary circumstances, and we
are not dealing with ordinary patent settlements.
In December 2012, the Supreme Court granted the petition for
180
certiorari in Watson Pharmaceuticals. Before the Court are the three
analyses discussed above. This Article argues that the Supreme Court’s
decision should be guided by the principles in Verizon Communications
v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko. Based on these principles, it is clear
that all three approaches should be rejected.
Trinko involved an antitrust challenge brought by customers of
181
Pursuant to the
AT&T against Verizon Communications Inc.
Telecommunications Act of 1996, incumbent local exchange carriers, such
182
as Verizon, were required to share their networks with competitors.
According to the complaint, Verizon failed to fill its rivals’ customer

176. See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc.,
405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); see also Carrier, supra note 17, at 72. Carrier notes that if a patent is invalid
or not infringed, there is no legitimate justification for delaying competition, and the reverse payment
agreement is a cover for market allocation.
177. Topco, 405 U.S. at 608.
178. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1072.
179. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931).
180. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 787 (2012).
181. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 404 (2004).
182. Id. at 401.
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service orders to discourage customers from using its rivals’ services.
Plaintiffs argued that this behavior constituted a refusal to deal in
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, which forbids monopolies or
184
attempts to monopolize.
To decide whether an antitrust violation existed, the Court first
determined “what effect (if any) the 1996 Act ha[d] upon the application
185
of traditional antitrust principles.” The Court further elaborated that
antitrust analysis “must always be attuned to the particular structure and
circumstances of the industry at issue. Part of that attention to economic
186
context is an awareness of the significance of regulation.” The Court
added that antitrust analysis “must sensitively recognize and reflect the
distinctive economic and legal setting of the regulated industry to which
187
it applies.” This last statement is a quote from Town of Concord v.
Boston Edison Co., a First Circuit opinion that was written by then Chief
188
Judge Breyer.
The Supreme Court’s approach in Trinko is based in part on Boston
189
Edison. The latter involved a claim brought by municipal distributors
of electricity against a fully integrated investor-owned utility, whose rates
190
are regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. The
municipal distributors alleged that the defendant engaged in a price
191
squeeze in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. The court held
that this type of price squeeze would not ordinarily violate the Sherman
Act because the defendant’s prices were regulated at both levels of
192
production. The court further explained: “[I]n light of regulatory rules,
constraints, and practices, the price squeeze at issue here is not ordinarily
exclusionary, and, for that reason, it does not violate the Sherman
193
Act.” The court reached its conclusion by “(1) analyzing the ordinary
price squeeze, (2) comparing it to the ‘regulatory’ price squeeze, and
(3) noting that regulation makes a critical difference in terms of antitrust
194
harms, benefits, and administrative considerations.” Adopting a portion
of this analysis and applying it to the telecommunications industry, the
Trinko court concluded that the regulatory framework demonstrated

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 404.
Id. at 407.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 411.
Id. (quoting Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990)).
Boston Edison, 915 F.2d at 22.
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411–12 (citing Boston Edison, 915 F.2d 17).
Boston Edison, 915 F.2d at 20–21.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 23.
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“how, in certain circumstances, ‘regulation significantly diminishes the
195
likelihood of major antitrust harm.’”
Applying the foregoing analysis to reverse payment settlements
results in a different conclusion. The circuit courts that utilize the
exclusionary scope analysis are arguably stuck in part one of the Boston
Edison analysis. They treat reverse payment settlements as ordinary
patent settlements in an unregulated industry. But according to Trinko,
in conducting their antitrust analysis, the courts need to consider “the
particular structure and circumstances of the industry at issue.” They
must be aware of “the significance of regulation.” In other words, they
need to consider the particular circumstances of the pharmaceutical
industry and how the Hatch-Waxman Act affects competition in that
industry.
Under the framework laid out in Trinko and Boston Edison, we
should first compare the ordinary patent settlement to the Hatch-Waxman
reverse payment settlement. When settling a patent claim in an
unregulated industry, the alleged infringer pays a royalty fee to continue
selling its product. In other words, patent settlements in unregulated
industries result in more competition, not less competition. In contrast, in
the Hatch-Waxman context, when the parties settle and the brand
company pays the generic company to delay its entry, it precludes all
other generics from entering the market.
Next, we should consider whether the Hatch-Waxman Act makes a
significant difference with respect to antitrust harms and benefits. Through
the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress sought to promote competition by
encouraging patent challenges. It tried to promote these challenges by
offering a 180-day exclusive marketing period. But the Hatch-Waxman
Act is malfunctioning. The 180-day exclusivity period has encouraged the
formation of reverse payment settlements, which harm consumers. Given
the size of the payments and the high success rate of generic companies,
it appears that reverse payment settlements are extending patents that
are invalid and/or not infringed. As a result, the regulatory framework of
the Hatch-Waxman Act is significantly increasing the likelihood of
competitive harm. A reverse payment settlement in the pharmaceutical
industry will normally constitute a market allocation agreement.
In reaching its decision in Watson Pharmaceuticals, the Eleventh
Circuit relied on the presumption of validity and the policy favoring
settlement. The exclusionary scope analysis is a perfect blend of these
two principles. Thus, this test may be appropriate for ordinary patent

195. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 412 (2004) (quoting
Boston Edison, 915 F.2d at 25).
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settlements in an unregulated industry. But it is the wrong test for
reverse payment settlements in the pharmaceutical industry.
Because the regulatory structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act
significantly increases the likelihood of antitrust harm, the general
principal that courts should encourage settlement should not be a factor at
all when analyzing reverse payment settlements. Because these settlements
are more likely to extend patents that are invalid, the courts should focus
on the public interest in removing invalid patents when creating their
antitrust analysis. The presumption of illegality, which is utilized in In re
K-Dur, is insufficient to uphold this public interest. Rather, the courts
196
must decide the merits of the underlying patent claim.
Other commentators have also advocated an industry-specific
approach to reverse payment settlements. For example, in an article they
co-authored, Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley voiced support for such an
197
approach. Relying in part on Trinko, Carrier has also advocated an
industry-specific approach, arguing that the language of the HatchWaxman Act demonstrates the secondary relevance of the settlement198
related policies on which the courts have focused their analysis. I agree
that the courts are wrong to focus on the policy favoring settlement in
analyzing these settlements. But I think the error is clear from the effect
that the Hatch-Waxman Act has on competition, not from the language
of the Act itself. The courts did not err by failing to consider the policies
advanced in the Act. The error is in their failure to recognize that the
regulatory framework of the Act is hurting competition, and to tailor
their antitrust analysis accordingly.
The aforementioned scholars do not support a full analysis on the
199
merits. It is easy to understand why. Patent litigation is complex and
time consuming, and the courts are busy. But let us not forget that we are
dealing with a regulatory regime that significantly increases the
likelihood of major antitrust harm and provides absolutely no antitrust
scrutiny. As the Supreme Court noted in Trinko, where there “‘is
nothing built into the regulatory scheme which performs the antitrust
function,’ the benefits of antitrust are worth its sometimes considerable
200
disadvantages.” In this context, the benefits to be gained are better
health, freedom from pain, and in some cases, the chance to live.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Specifically, the courts must decide the issues of validity and infringement.
Hovenkamp et al., supra note 28, at 1736–39.
Carrier, supra note 17, at 69.
Id. at 73; Hovenkamp et al., supra note 28, at 1759–61.
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412 (citation omitted).
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Conclusion
This Article has argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Watson
Pharmaceuticals should be guided by the principles in Trinko. During the
last ten years, the circuit courts have developed three different approaches
to analyzing reverse payment settlements. Unfortunately, none of these
approaches fully complies with Trinko’s directive to consider the unique
circumstances of the industry at issue. The Sixth Circuit’s approach
completely ignores the fact that these settlements involve a patent. The
exclusionary scope analysis relies on the presumption of validity and the
policy favoring settlement even though these settlements are more likely
to involve an invalid patent, and have been shown to harm consumers.
Lastly, the Third Circuit approach applies a quick look rule of reason
analysis to agreements that may be per se illegal market allocation
agreements.
The Hatch-Waxman Act itself has provided the foundation for
reverse payment settlements. These settlements do not serve the public
interest—they benefit the pharmaceutical companies at the expense of
consumers. Based on the industry-specific approach mandated in Trinko,
the Court should conclude that the general policy favoring settlement
should not be a factor in this antitrust analysis and that the courts should
decide the merits of the underlying patent claim.

